An acquaintance of mine once told me, in a frustrated response to one of my blog posts, that “humanity is meaningless”. I guess I should have seen his frustration coming. Looking back on it now, the text message I had used to direct him to the blog post itself could have been perceived as being quite snarky. Not to mention, he read the post back when I had most of my posts titled with the combative opening “Battle Against…” and the title of the whole blog was still “Crusaders Papers”. (For those of you who know what I’m talking about, thanks for sticking with this blog for so long!)
Nonetheless, I was stricken by his assessment of humanity. “All of it? Meaningless? Really?!” Over time, I came to discover that he was far from the only cynic in the world, and that most other cynics went much farther than him in their negative assessments. I came to realize the striking popularity of the opinion that everything is meaningless. Naturally, in consideration of its popularity, I began a mental investigation of this worldview. Can the view that everything is meaningless withstand rigorous philosophical scrutiny? Furthermore, can we live with the implications of such a view? These and more questions on the opinion of meaninglessness are addressed in the following essay.
Tuesday, December 1, 2015
2) Everything is Meaningless...?
What are the most common defenses given to the assertion that everything is meaningless? When asked, someone who holds this view just might give you a miniature sermon covering everything from hurricanes to Hitler: “Do you not see humanity? Do you not know of child sex trafficking abroad, or the amount of child molestation here in your own country? Do you not know of Hitler, Stalin, the Rwandan genocides, ISIS, etc. and how all the people in those cultures were just going along with it as if there was nothing wrong? Did you not see the devastation of Hurricane Katrina or the earthquake in Haiti?”
To this, I might quite legitimately respond with confusion. Why, after all, does this man care about the death of billions of innocent men, women and children if everything is meaningless? If everything is meaningless, then so too are the lives of humans. The very most that a death could be to someone, on the cynic’s view, is inconvenient. For a man with his convictions to be quite so indignant about the mass death of millions is quite the same as if I became indignant at the fact that men heartlessly trample over dirt, day-in and day-out.
To this, I might quite legitimately respond with confusion. Why, after all, does this man care about the death of billions of innocent men, women and children if everything is meaningless? If everything is meaningless, then so too are the lives of humans. The very most that a death could be to someone, on the cynic’s view, is inconvenient. For a man with his convictions to be quite so indignant about the mass death of millions is quite the same as if I became indignant at the fact that men heartlessly trample over dirt, day-in and day-out.
3) Everything is Meaningless...?
Suppose the cynic rebuts by saying that he believes that the value of human life is universal simply by coincidence, and not because there is any real value to human life in any way that refutes his own position. If asked why this value is universal, the cynic would likely point to the herd instinct. Thus would he argue that his and others’ value of human life arose out of the fact that man is, by instinct, a social creature, and not because humans are objectively meaningful in any way that refutes his view that everything is meaningless.
This seems a very poor rebuttal, for any historian will tell you that this sense of value we have in the West for each individual human life is due to the influence of Judeo-Christian values, not the herd instinct. Yet that is a worldview which boldly asserts that the world is, in fact, profoundly meaningful (unless, of course, God is divorced from it, a fact quite poignantly stated in Ecclesiastes). Before the rise of Christianity, you’d be hard-pressed to find a culture that really valued human life. As a for-instance, before Christians condemned it, the Romans (among other things, mind you) practiced pederasty; a practice in which an older Roman man would take a young man under his wing and show him “the ways of the world”. Sure, he was the boy's teacher. But he would also sexually abuse him. The more one studies history, the more one realizes that the herd instinct is quite inadequate when it comes to inspiring men to really value other men.
Furthermore, what does the herd instinct have to do with innocent men, women and children who were brutally murdered nearly a century ago at the hands of men like Hitler and Stalin? When last I checked, the herd instinct is nothing more than a way to describe man’s natural inclination to belong to and/or identify with a group. How could this native drive, of its own accord, synthesize hatred for murderous men that we’ve never even met? In fact, I’d go so far as to say that the herd instinct cannot, of its own accord, cause sadness at the death even of a very close friend or relative. For in its most basic form, the herd instinct tells us what we will do. It forecasts the future. How, then, can it cause us to mourn the past?
As a matter of fact, mourning over the past not-so-infrequently results in the herd instinct being inhibited. We all know of those who became shut-ins after the loss of a loved one. It would be patently absurd to say that the herd instinct, acting alone, can cause its own inhibition. Thus the herd instinct cannot adequately explain our sense of sadness at the loss of human life, or, by extension, our sense of value for human life. The cynic has yet to supply an adequate reason as to why he values human life without conceding that there really is meaning in the world.
This seems a very poor rebuttal, for any historian will tell you that this sense of value we have in the West for each individual human life is due to the influence of Judeo-Christian values, not the herd instinct. Yet that is a worldview which boldly asserts that the world is, in fact, profoundly meaningful (unless, of course, God is divorced from it, a fact quite poignantly stated in Ecclesiastes). Before the rise of Christianity, you’d be hard-pressed to find a culture that really valued human life. As a for-instance, before Christians condemned it, the Romans (among other things, mind you) practiced pederasty; a practice in which an older Roman man would take a young man under his wing and show him “the ways of the world”. Sure, he was the boy's teacher. But he would also sexually abuse him. The more one studies history, the more one realizes that the herd instinct is quite inadequate when it comes to inspiring men to really value other men.
Furthermore, what does the herd instinct have to do with innocent men, women and children who were brutally murdered nearly a century ago at the hands of men like Hitler and Stalin? When last I checked, the herd instinct is nothing more than a way to describe man’s natural inclination to belong to and/or identify with a group. How could this native drive, of its own accord, synthesize hatred for murderous men that we’ve never even met? In fact, I’d go so far as to say that the herd instinct cannot, of its own accord, cause sadness at the death even of a very close friend or relative. For in its most basic form, the herd instinct tells us what we will do. It forecasts the future. How, then, can it cause us to mourn the past?
As a matter of fact, mourning over the past not-so-infrequently results in the herd instinct being inhibited. We all know of those who became shut-ins after the loss of a loved one. It would be patently absurd to say that the herd instinct, acting alone, can cause its own inhibition. Thus the herd instinct cannot adequately explain our sense of sadness at the loss of human life, or, by extension, our sense of value for human life. The cynic has yet to supply an adequate reason as to why he values human life without conceding that there really is meaning in the world.
4) Everything is Meaningless...?
From here, the cynic might take another line of defense. He might say that meaning is totally subjective. No meaning exists, says he, except that which is synthesized by each individual man. This is an effective way to say that the world is meaningless while also justifying his indignance with humanity. Now when the cynic speaks of his indignance at humanity, he speaks in terms of his own personal synthesis of meaning.
This hardly helps to deflect the cynic’s problem. He has synthesized his own meaning. Very well. To use his own terminology, so did Hitler. So did Stalin. So did the Rwandans. And, if I may say so in jest, hurricanes and the earth’s tectonic plates are certainly in the “make your own meaning” business! The cynic’s grounds for indignance have once again crumbled. If meaning is totally invented, then who is he to judge Hitler or Stalin or the Rwandans? Either meaning is totally subjective, in which case indignance toward these ills is a rather arrogant clinging to one’s own view, or there is such a thing as true, objective meaning, in which case indignance is deserved, but cynicism and the view that everything is meaningless becomes hogwash.
This hardly helps to deflect the cynic’s problem. He has synthesized his own meaning. Very well. To use his own terminology, so did Hitler. So did Stalin. So did the Rwandans. And, if I may say so in jest, hurricanes and the earth’s tectonic plates are certainly in the “make your own meaning” business! The cynic’s grounds for indignance have once again crumbled. If meaning is totally invented, then who is he to judge Hitler or Stalin or the Rwandans? Either meaning is totally subjective, in which case indignance toward these ills is a rather arrogant clinging to one’s own view, or there is such a thing as true, objective meaning, in which case indignance is deserved, but cynicism and the view that everything is meaningless becomes hogwash.
5) Everything is Meaningless...?
The intellectual who holds that everything is meaningless would more likely than not say that he believes that his opinion is correct. This implies that others ought to agree with him, at least on non-peripheral issues, whether or not the intellectual intends this implication. Please note that I have no problem with this. But to this situation, I might respond, “If the world truly is meaningless, then what reason have I not to simply continue pretending as if the world was meaningful?” The cynical intellectual might respond, “Because, it is merely pretending. You’d be living a lie.” By saying this, the intellectual appeals to the benefits of aligning one’s life with truth. But what is so good about aligning one’s life to truth if everything is meaningless? How can we say that a man ought to believe the truth? There are no “oughts” if everything is meaningless.
That is the colossal problem with the opinion that everything is meaningless. By arguing its philosophical credentials to me, the cynic has simultaneously provided me with absolutely no incentive to actually agree with him. He says that everything is meaningless? Well, then, why should I not simply continue pretending as if it was not so? His philosophy cannot stop me. Moreover, it is not hard to find good reason to acquire even a pretended sense of meaning, now that pretending is justified. It was observed in many concentration camps in Nazi Germany that, among those never taken to their deaths in the gas chambers, the difference between those who lived and those who died was that those who lived had a powerful sense of purpose and meaning. If the world truly is meaningless, then they were merely pretending. And yet their "pretending" has inspired billions.
That is the colossal problem with the opinion that everything is meaningless. By arguing its philosophical credentials to me, the cynic has simultaneously provided me with absolutely no incentive to actually agree with him. He says that everything is meaningless? Well, then, why should I not simply continue pretending as if it was not so? His philosophy cannot stop me. Moreover, it is not hard to find good reason to acquire even a pretended sense of meaning, now that pretending is justified. It was observed in many concentration camps in Nazi Germany that, among those never taken to their deaths in the gas chambers, the difference between those who lived and those who died was that those who lived had a powerful sense of purpose and meaning. If the world truly is meaningless, then they were merely pretending. And yet their "pretending" has inspired billions.
6) Everything is Meaningless...?
David Hume once argued that morality could not be the product of pure reason on the grounds that reason is indicative whereas morality is imperative. What this basically means is that reason cannot move someone to choose between alternatives; it can only present and define the alternatives themselves. I once read an author of similar opinion who said that, while reason is invaluable for defining and evaluating ethical alternatives, it is little to no help in actually moving men to carry out those ethical decisions. The decision itself, said he, was the result of man's native drives (after proper conditioning, that is).
Though these authors were writing about ethics, I think that their insights can be applied to our present inquiry: worldview selection (and indeed, if it is decided that everything is meaningless, such a decision is bound to have a huge impact on the field of ethics). Reason may tell us when one worldview is right and another is wrong, but only objective values can move us to choose one over the other.
Though these authors were writing about ethics, I think that their insights can be applied to our present inquiry: worldview selection (and indeed, if it is decided that everything is meaningless, such a decision is bound to have a huge impact on the field of ethics). Reason may tell us when one worldview is right and another is wrong, but only objective values can move us to choose one over the other.
7) Everything is Meaningless...?
A lover of reason might say that, if it were demonstrated to him that a particular worldview is true, he would be compelled to embrace that worldview, not because he thought it was objectively valuable but because it was objectively true. Thus he might argue that the force behind his decision was reason and not value. Not bad; for a lover of reason, he argues well. However, he has missed a crucial step in his own decision-making process.
If I were to ask the question, “Why embrace the worldview that is true?” what answer could possibly be given to me? One might say, “Truth ought to be embraced,” or, “It is good to engage the world as it really is.” Look at this language: ought and good. Once again, objective value has sneaked in through the back door. It might seem obvious to us that, once a system of thought is demonstrated to us as being true, we ought to adhere to that system. But this jump from demonstration to adherence is not itself made by reason. It is, if you look closely, the result of one of man’s most powerful, most universal, and most fundamental intuitions simply stating that truth ought to be embraced. This intuition is so fundamental that it is often confused with reason itself, but there is clearly a difference.
Case in point: to demonstrate decisively to someone that a particular worldview is true does not, in fact, guarantee that they will embrace that worldview. Embracing requires something else; it requires them to value reason more than whatever else they might have to give up by dropping their own worldviews for this new one.
So we see that worldview selection is based on two criterion: reason, defined as the evaluation of truth-value, and values, one of which is the value that truth ought to be embraced. But that is the supreme difficulty with the worldview that everything is meaningless; it cuts itself off from this second criteria by denying the existence of any objective value. If this worldview demonstrated its own truth-value, it would simultaneously cut itself off from the only thing that can compel anyone to embrace it. There is no reason to embrace one worldview over another if everything is meaningless.
If I were to ask the question, “Why embrace the worldview that is true?” what answer could possibly be given to me? One might say, “Truth ought to be embraced,” or, “It is good to engage the world as it really is.” Look at this language: ought and good. Once again, objective value has sneaked in through the back door. It might seem obvious to us that, once a system of thought is demonstrated to us as being true, we ought to adhere to that system. But this jump from demonstration to adherence is not itself made by reason. It is, if you look closely, the result of one of man’s most powerful, most universal, and most fundamental intuitions simply stating that truth ought to be embraced. This intuition is so fundamental that it is often confused with reason itself, but there is clearly a difference.
Case in point: to demonstrate decisively to someone that a particular worldview is true does not, in fact, guarantee that they will embrace that worldview. Embracing requires something else; it requires them to value reason more than whatever else they might have to give up by dropping their own worldviews for this new one.
So we see that worldview selection is based on two criterion: reason, defined as the evaluation of truth-value, and values, one of which is the value that truth ought to be embraced. But that is the supreme difficulty with the worldview that everything is meaningless; it cuts itself off from this second criteria by denying the existence of any objective value. If this worldview demonstrated its own truth-value, it would simultaneously cut itself off from the only thing that can compel anyone to embrace it. There is no reason to embrace one worldview over another if everything is meaningless.
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