1) Everything is Meaningless...?

          An acquaintance of mine once told me, in a frustrated response to one of my blog posts, that “humanity is meaningless”.  I guess I should have seen his frustration coming.  Looking back on it now, the text message I had used to direct him to the blog post itself could have been perceived as being quite snarky.  Not to mention, he read the post back when I had most of my posts titled with the combative opening “Battle Against…” and the title of the whole blog was still “Crusaders Papers”.  (For those of you who know what I’m talking about, thanks for sticking with this blog for so long!)
           Nonetheless, I was stricken by his assessment of humanity.  “All of it?  Meaningless?  Really?!”  Over time, I came to discover that he was far from the only cynic in the world, and that most other cynics went much farther than him in their negative assessments.  I came to realize the striking popularity of the opinion that everything is meaningless.  Naturally, in consideration of its popularity, I began a mental investigation of this worldview.  Can the view that everything is meaningless withstand rigorous philosophical scrutiny?  Furthermore, can we live with the implications of such a view?  These and more questions on the opinion of meaninglessness are addressed in the following essay.

2) Everything is Meaningless...?

          What are the most common defenses given to the assertion that everything is meaningless?  When asked, someone who holds this view just might give you a miniature sermon covering everything from hurricanes to Hitler: “Do you not see humanity?  Do you not know of child sex trafficking abroad, or the amount of child molestation here in your own country?  Do you not know of Hitler, Stalin, the Rwandan genocides, ISIS, etc. and how all the people in those cultures were just going along with it as if there was nothing wrong?  Did you not see the devastation of Hurricane Katrina or the earthquake in Haiti?”
          To this, I might quite legitimately respond with confusion.  Why, after all, does this man care about the death of billions of innocent men, women and children if everything is meaningless?  If everything is meaningless, then so too are the lives of humans.  The very most that a death could be to someone, on the cynic’s view, is inconvenient.  For a man with his convictions to be quite so indignant about the mass death of millions is quite the same as if I became indignant at the fact that men heartlessly trample over dirt, day-in and day-out.

3) Everything is Meaningless...?

          Suppose the cynic rebuts by saying that he believes that the value of human life is universal simply by coincidence, and not because there is any real value to human life in any way that refutes his own position.  If asked why this value is universal, the cynic would likely point to the herd instinct.  Thus would he argue that his and others’ value of human life arose out of the fact that man is, by instinct, a social creature, and not because humans are objectively meaningful in any way that refutes his view that everything is meaningless.
          This seems a very poor rebuttal, for any historian will tell you that this sense of value we have in the West for each individual human life is due to the influence of Judeo-Christian values, not the herd instinct.  Yet that is a worldview which boldly asserts that the world is, in fact, profoundly meaningful (unless, of course, God is divorced from it, a fact quite poignantly stated in Ecclesiastes).  Before the rise of Christianity, you’d be hard-pressed to find a culture that really valued human life.  As a for-instance, before Christians condemned it, the Romans (among other things, mind you) practiced pederasty; a practice in which an older Roman man would take a young man under his wing and show him “the ways of the world”.  Sure, he was the boy's teacher.  But he would also sexually abuse him.  The more one studies history, the more one realizes that the herd instinct is quite inadequate when it comes to inspiring men to really value other men.
          Furthermore, what does the herd instinct have to do with innocent men, women and children who were brutally murdered nearly a century ago at the hands of men like Hitler and Stalin?  When last I checked, the herd instinct is nothing more than a way to describe man’s natural inclination to belong to and/or identify with a group.  How could this native drive, of its own accord, synthesize hatred for murderous men that we’ve never even met?  In fact, I’d go so far as to say that the herd instinct cannot, of its own accord, cause sadness at the death even of a very close friend or relative.  For in its most basic form, the herd instinct tells us what we will do.  It forecasts the future.  How, then, can it cause us to mourn the past?
          As a matter of fact, mourning over the past not-so-infrequently results in the herd instinct being inhibited.  We all know of those who became shut-ins after the loss of a loved one.  It would be patently absurd to say that the herd instinct, acting alone, can cause its own inhibition.  Thus the herd instinct cannot adequately explain our sense of sadness at the loss of human life, or, by extension, our sense of value for human life.  The cynic has yet to supply an adequate reason as to why he values human life without conceding that there really is meaning in the world.

4) Everything is Meaningless...?

          From here, the cynic might take another line of defense.  He might say that meaning is totally subjective.  No meaning exists, says he, except that which is synthesized by each individual man.  This is an effective way to say that the world is meaningless while also justifying his indignance with humanity.  Now when the cynic speaks of his indignance at humanity, he speaks in terms of his own personal synthesis of meaning.
          This hardly helps to deflect the cynic’s problem.  He has synthesized his own meaning.  Very well.  To use his own terminology, so did Hitler.  So did Stalin.  So did the Rwandans.  And, if I may say so in jest, hurricanes and the earth’s tectonic plates are certainly in the “make your own meaning” business!  The cynic’s grounds for indignance have once again crumbled.  If meaning is totally invented, then who is he to judge Hitler or Stalin or the Rwandans?  Either meaning is totally subjective, in which case indignance toward these ills is a rather arrogant clinging to one’s own view, or there is such a thing as true, objective meaning, in which case indignance is deserved, but cynicism and the view that everything is meaningless becomes hogwash.

5) Everything is Meaningless...?

          The intellectual who holds that everything is meaningless would more likely than not say that he believes that his opinion is correct.  This implies that others ought to agree with him, at least on non-peripheral issues, whether or not the intellectual intends this implication.  Please note that I have no problem with this.  But to this situation, I might respond, “If the world truly is meaningless, then what reason have I not to simply continue pretending as if the world was meaningful?”  The cynical intellectual might respond, “Because, it is merely pretending.  You’d be living a lie.”  By saying this, the intellectual appeals to the benefits of aligning one’s life with truth.  But what is so good about aligning one’s life to truth if everything is meaningless?  How can we say that a man ought to believe the truth?  There are no “oughts” if everything is meaningless.
          That is the colossal problem with the opinion that everything is meaningless.  By arguing its philosophical credentials to me, the cynic has simultaneously provided me with absolutely no incentive to actually agree with him.  He says that everything is meaningless?  Well, then, why should I not simply continue pretending as if it was not so?  His philosophy cannot stop me.  Moreover, it is not hard to find good reason to acquire even a pretended sense of meaning, now that pretending is justified.  It was observed in many concentration camps in Nazi Germany that, among those never taken to their deaths in the gas chambers, the difference between those who lived and those who died was that those who lived had a powerful sense of purpose and meaning. If the world truly is meaningless, then they were merely pretending.  And yet their "pretending" has inspired billions.

6) Everything is Meaningless...?

          David Hume once argued that morality could not be the product of pure reason on the grounds that reason is indicative whereas morality is imperative.  What this basically means is that reason cannot move someone to choose between alternatives; it can only present and define the alternatives themselves.  I once read an author of similar opinion who said that, while reason is invaluable for defining and evaluating ethical alternatives, it is little to no help in actually moving men to carry out those ethical decisions.  The decision itself, said he, was the result of man's native drives (after proper conditioning, that is).
          Though these authors were writing about ethics, I think that their insights can be applied to our present inquiry: worldview selection (and indeed, if it is decided that everything is meaningless, such a decision is bound to have a huge impact on the field of ethics).  Reason may tell us when one worldview is right and another is wrong, but only objective values can move us to choose one over the other.

7) Everything is Meaningless...?

        A lover of reason might say that, if it were demonstrated to him that a particular worldview is true, he would be compelled to embrace that worldview, not because he thought it was objectively valuable but because it was objectively true.  Thus he might argue that the force behind his decision was reason and not value.  Not bad; for a lover of reason, he argues well.  However, he has missed a crucial step in his own decision-making process.
          If I were to ask the question, “Why embrace the worldview that is true?” what answer could possibly be given to me?  One might say, “Truth ought to be embraced,” or,  “It is good to engage the world as it really is.”  Look at this language: ought and good.  Once again, objective value has sneaked in through the back door.  It might seem obvious to us that, once a system of thought is demonstrated to us as being true, we ought to adhere to that system.  But this jump from demonstration to adherence is not itself made by reason.  It is, if you look closely, the result of one of man’s most powerful, most universal, and most fundamental intuitions simply stating that truth ought to be embraced.  This intuition is so fundamental that it is often confused with reason itself, but there is clearly a difference.
          Case in point: to demonstrate decisively to someone that a particular worldview is true does not, in fact, guarantee that they will embrace that worldview.  Embracing requires something else; it requires them to value reason more than whatever else they might have to give up by dropping their own worldviews for this new one.
          So we see that worldview selection is based on two criterion: reason, defined as the evaluation of truth-value, and values, one of which is the value that truth ought to be embraced.  But that is the supreme difficulty with the worldview that everything is meaningless; it cuts itself off from this second criteria by denying the existence of any objective value.  If this worldview demonstrated its own truth-value, it would simultaneously cut itself off from the only thing that can compel anyone to embrace it.  There is no reason to embrace one worldview over another if everything is meaningless.

8) Everything is Meaningless...?

          The opinion of meaninglessness, by the way, affects a lot more than the selection of alternate worldviews.  Infinitely worse, it destroys our ability to select between any set of competing alternatives.  Reason may tell me that it is physically healthier to run for thirty minutes everyday than to sit on the couch, play video games, and eat junk food all day, but only objective value can tell me that it is better to be physically healthy than physically unhealthy.  Reason may tell me that it is psychologically healthier to see a counselor than to self-harm, but only objective value inclines me to strive for psychological health.  Reason may appraise the life of the gracious and benevolent man and forewarn against a life of murder, rape, and child abuse.  And yet it is only objective value which can give me the imperative to choose one or the other.
          The cynic who says that everything is meaningless probably does not realize the far-reaching implications of his views.  He has embraced a worldview which has been proven, time and again, to be incapable of functioning in the world as it is.  After the rejection of objective value, the only criterion for decision making would be the strongest desire of the moment.  To truly act in accord with this philosophy is to become an animal.  C. S. Lewis once argued in The Abolition of Man that those who would reject objective value elect to become slaves to their own native instincts, and thus, to nature itself.  To reject meaning is to reject one’s own humanity.

9) Everything is Meaningless...?

          Society at large takes cynicism to be a sign of maturity and realistic thinking.  Surely, the one who looks at the world and sees lollipops and rainbows is deranged, and so men have learned to praise the opposite extreme.  Yet, in light of recent arguments, I would boldly assert that precisely the opposite is true: that cynicism is a sign of immaturity and escapism.  Before I go on, I would like to make clear that I do not submit the following explanation as holding true for everyone who believes that everything is meaningless.  That said, the fact that those who conclude that everything is meaningless often do so because something meaningful was taken from them, or from those around them, makes me think that often times their cynical worldview is just an elaborate defense mechanism.
          One of the more cliche problems of personality is the fear of rejection, the fear of being let down, etc.  Many times, someone will assume that a potential friend or significant other will fall perilously short of their expectations right from the outset, and so spoil the relationship.  One might assume the worst in someone as a defense mechanism, in the hopes that it will prevent them from ever being sad or disappointed.  (How’s that working out for you?)  Could the view that everything is meaningless be a similar defense mechanism on a larger scale?  Could it be that the cynic assumes the worst from life, the universe, etc. in a futile attempt not to be bogged down by sadness and disappointment?
          It is not altogether implausible.  Of the people I know who are cynical in this way, every one of them show the signs of repression and psychological trauma, and their sense of meaninglessness fits in well with the idea that they are using this opinion as a defense against further trauma.  Now, again, I do not submit this as true for everyone who believes the world to be meaningless.  There may be other reasons for someone to believe this.  But I do know that this opinion can be used as a way to deny and suppress one’s own feelings of sadness and disappointment in the guise of a supposedly sophisticated and intellectual opinion.  It is easier (or so it would seem easier) to react to disappointment with fear and anger rather than genuine, cathartic sadness.  If anything, I’d say cynicism invites the latter reaction, not the former.

10) Everything is Meaningless...?

          What does the cynic mean when he says that everything is meaningless?  What is he getting at?  Most of us identify with his indignance at hurricanes and Hitler, we simply see that the conclusion he has drawn from this is rather overreaching.  What conclusion might better fit the evidence?  Well, we might simply say that the world is not as meaningful as it could be.  Meaningful things are always being snatched away from us in the wrong ways and at the wrong times: our families, our friends, our faith, our innocence, and many times even our lives.
          On this point, we are quite in agreement with the cynic.  But our view has far different practical implications.  The opinion of meaningless, of itself, can only ever lead to inaction.  Why do this or that if all is meaningless?  What would you do in a meaningless world, and, perhaps more importantly, why?  With the conclusion that meaning is under attack, however, the call to action changes entirely.  It naturally leads us to two very central questions.  First, what is meaningful?  Second, how can these meaningful things be restored to us?  To answer such questions is quite outside the scope of this single essay.  I pass that duty on to my reader.

1) On the Issue of Homosexuality: Introduction

The issue of homosexuality - indeed, of sexuality in general - is a highly debated topic all over the globe.  Extremists and moderates from both sides submit their opinions on the matter, constructive or demonizing, informed or uninformed, etc.  It is in the spirit of that debate that I submit yet another probably unnecessary, but hopefully useful opinion.  In regards to homosexuality specifically, I confess myself more conservative.  (The reader should also note that I do not here submit my opinions regarding more specific issues, such as homosexual marriage.  To treat such an issue, and many others, at my level of expertise would be premature.)  I believe homosexuality is against one’s own good; it is psychologically unhealthy for two persons of the same gender to have a sexualized relationship.  If you would allow me, I would like to explain myself in these matters.

2) On the Issue of Homosexuality: the Rules of Relating

Relationships are more immutable than modern people like to give off. The fact of the matter is that there are certain, largely unspoken "rules of relating" which most people assume to come intuitively. You do not relate to your mother the same way you do your sister, nor do you relate to your father as you do your brother, nor your friends as to anyone in your family. Further investigation reveals that these unspoken rules of relating are for our own good. To relate to your mother the way you relate to your wife (I speak from the son's perspective) would be at best awkward, at worst perverse. To relate to a mentor as you would a younger brother would deprive him of his due respect and deprive you of the potential life lessons that only someone in the mentorship position can provide. The rules of relating, therefore, cannot be haphazardly accused of "limiting our freedoms" or "limiting our love". It is through their guidelines that we are able to relate to people meaningfully whatsoever. You might say that it is only through following these rules that we are "free" to relate to anyone at all.

I'd like to remind the reader here that I do not intend to provide a discourse on exactly what these rules are. Only a few of the rules of relating will be discussed towards the end of this essay. For now, I content myself with the assertion merely that there are rules to be found, and that they are to be obeyed for everyone's good.

For method's sake, I'd like to make another point that is more common sense than any. Relationships diverge in type because there are objective differences between people. You do not relate to your father the way you relate to a male mentor because half of your genetic material was derived from one and not the other. You relate to an older friend differently than you do a younger friend because one is older and one is younger. You relate to people differently because people are different.

Thus far, my examples have submitted a few categories of difference between people, including age (younger versus older), blood (family versus friend), law (married versus unmarried), etc. I'd here like to submit another category on which different people, and therefore different relationships emerge. That category is gender.

This is really the snag in the argument, for the modern sexual agenda is contingent upon the axiom that there is no distinction between gender; no psychological or emotional distinction, anyway. It is permissible for a man to have sex with a woman or a man, say the secular progressives, because there is no meaningful distinction between the two genders. Is this true? I'll need to consider that question at length.

3) On the Issue of Homosexuality: Gender Dies Hard

Psychologists and biologists alike tell us that man, though consisting of several components, is ultimately unified within himself. His physical life (i.e. his health and purely natural impulses) is deeply and profoundly connected to his psychical life (i.e. his thoughts and emotions). Where one falters, so does the other, and where one thrives, the other is caught up with it. Research shows that emotional duress can actually result in physical infirmity, such as fatigue and illness, and prolonged times of sickness and especially being bed-ridden is connected to depression and distress in the psychical life. On the flip side, a bit of physical exercise and proper diet does wonders for one's mentality.

It would therefore be a fantastic contention to claim that two entirely different physiques could produce the exact same psychologies. But that is exactly what the secular progressives are doing; they claim that men and women - two entirely different anatomies - possess the exact same psychological and emotional makeup. Such a contention clashes with the biologists, the psychologists, and the clear and present evidence, all in one arrogant stroke. As just one example, testosterone, and the lack thereof, produces psychological and emotional effects that are distinct from the effects of estrogen. And yet the former chemical is unique to men and the latter is unique to women.

More to the point, and biology aside, secular progressives cannot, in fact, contend that there is no meaningful distinction between genders without plunging into self-contradiction. The fact of the matter is that they, like everyone else, use gender as a reference point to distinguish between people. The only real distinction between a heterosexual man and a homosexual man is that one is sexually attracted to men and the other is sexually attracted to women. The difference is regarded by the LGBT community (largely containing secular progressives) as meaningful enough; only the latter will be welcomed into their fold. But the only real difference between the two is one of gender: one is sexually attracted to one gender and the other is attracted to the other gender. If there is no meaningful distinction between gender, then there is no meaningful distinction between the heterosexual and the homosexual man. The LGBT community can be sued for arbitrarily discriminating.

Given the biological evidence and the philosophical conundrum of the secular progressive, we conclude that men and women are inherently different.

Allow me to tell you very briefly what I am not saying. I am not saying that men and women are inherently unequal. That is one of the blunders of today's language: lumping the word "difference" into the same category as the word "equal". But, of course, the colors red and blue are quite different without either of them being less valid as colors. That is all that I am trying to say about men and women. They are inherently equal (by proper definition of the word "equal") but also inherently different. Furthermore, as before, I do not intend to give a list of exactly what these differences are. I am only defending the principle that there are differences to be found.

It follows from the hitherto defended conclusion that a man must relate to men differently than he relates to women, since the rules of relating are derived from objective differences between people. We can expect to find rules and principles behind a man's interaction with another man to be different and/or completely missing from his interaction with a woman. What are those rules, you might be itching to find out? I shall have to consider this question at great length.

4) On the Issue of Homosexuality: Man and Woman

It would seem not only that the rules of relating are generated by difference between people, but that these rules are, for lack of a better term, derivative from those differences. A younger person relating to someone who is greater than himself in age considers him greater than himself in many other respects. The older person considers his student less than himself, certainly not in terms of value, but in the sense that he values his student enough to bend down to his level and lift him up higher. Relationships between friends of equal age ought to, and usually do, involve a lot of give-and-take, since they see each other as equals. Sons want to be like their fathers because, in a very real sense, they already are very much like their fathers biologically (and therefore, by extension, psychologically) speaking.

Therefore, the first thing to consider when attempting to define rules of relating between genders is to look at what their differences are. Well, to state the obvious, opposite genders are, biologically speaking, sexually cooperative, whereas same genders are not. As a derivative of the differences, then, the rules of relating dictate that a relationship between two men or two women ought not be sexual, whereas a sexual relationship between a man and a woman is permissible. The idea that homosexuality is emotionally and psychologically "fit" for certain people as a relational rule cannot possibly be derived from the fact that sexual relations between same genders is physically "unfit", and sometimes even detrimental.

A critic of this conclusion might point out that, under this logic, we would have to justify sexual relations between any given man and woman, such as a son and his mother and a daughter and her father. But what such a critic fails to realize is that the rules of relating, with their derivative nature, have this supposed problem covered as well. Sex, among its many attributes, is profoundly mutual and treats (or ought to treat, anyway) each participant as an equal. If the participants are not actually equal, in the sense that both are in the same stages of life, then that creates problems. Someone who is in their adolescent years should not have sexual relations with someone in their young adult years (indeed, I would say that not even two adolescents should have a sexual relationship with each other or anyone else; but I do not insist on this, for it is outside the scope of this essay). That is why children shouldn't have sex with their parents and spouses should not have sex with strangers; there are already "rules of relating" set in place precluding the rule that sex is permissible between opposite genders.

It is as the psychologists and biologists tell us: the physical is profoundly connected to the psychical. Why then, if sex is not physically fit for two people of the same gender should we suppose that a sexual relationship between two people of the same gender is psychologically fit? If psychology is greatly affected by physiology, than that which is physically unfit must be psychologically unfit as well.

5) On the Issue of Homosexuality: Answers to Misgivings

I suspect that some of you might feel cheated at this juncture. "He has given us this roundabout lecture about the connection between physiology and psychology and these absolute 'rules of relating' just to make the same argument as everyone else; homoerotic behavior is physically unfit and is therefore, somehow, morally wrong. For God's sake, we have all heard it!" The critic probably makes this complaint amid his insistence that homosexuality is "his/her love" and that I have no right to invalidate it. But remember that the rules of relating are immune to the complaint that they "limit my love". The rules of relating are for our own good. We do not consider ourselves to have committed some crime by forbidding children to sexualize their love for their parents because it is against his/her own good to do so.

And that brings me to a point which I would like to make abundantly clear. I am not trying to argue here that homosexuality is immoral, but merely that it is against one's own good. The contention of the critic, then, that it is "their love" has no bearing here. He is talking past me. Whether we like it or not, there are rules for how to love (what I have hitherto called "rules of relating"). It is my contention that sex is unnecessary - indeed, that it is detrimental - to the consummation of love between two men and two women. The critic, therefore, must argue specifically that homosexuality is psychologically feasible as an expression of love to be engaging my argument at all.

6) On the Issue of Homosexuality: the "Born this Way" Argument

It is at this point that we hear the inevitable "born this way" argument as the secular progressives attempt to justify the psychological feasibility of homosexuality. It is their contention that people are born with a pre-determined sexual instinct aimed at those of the same gender. There is plenty of room to doubt such a contention. First off, research shows that homosexuality is really much more a combination of nature and nurture than pure nature. A man, for instance, usually turns out homosexual because he is born with some personality traits which are considered more feminine - such as sensitivity and spontaneity - and then either told that he is gay by society and eventually buckles under social pressure or he sexualizes his relationship with men to make up for some past relationship with a male mentor that went terribly wrong.

Furthermore, the "born this way" argument simply cannot be harmonized with the point I have made so many times before; that physiology and psychology are inextricably linked. Now, someone who is "born gay" is born a male simply by reference; by calling him “gay”, we say he is a man who is sexually attracted to other men. But the body of the male is sexually cooperative only with a female's body; in the case of two men, to put it abstractly, “the parts don’t fit”. This brings us to the rather bizarre conclusion that one can be born with a physiology that is sexually cooperative with women yet a psychology that is sexually cooperative with men. The person is, in essence, born a walking contradiction.  How can this be?  How can one be born with a psychology that contradicts their physiology? More to the point, how does this play out in practice, example by example? Does testosterone magically have a different psychological effect in the homosexual man as opposed to the heterosexual man? The fact that secular progressive scientists are looking for a "gay gene" shows that they acknowledge this irresolvable tension between body and mind; the fact that they haven't found the gene shows that the tension is still unresolved; and the fact that there have been so many "gay gene scares", where a false publication had been made that the gay gene had been found, makes me suspect that no such gene will ever be found. The logical problem here remains ever unresolved.

Yet to pursue the point a skeptic might say, "But people are born with defective psychologies and physiology all the time; faulty brains, intestines that self-defeat, etc. Why an exception here? Why is homosexuality impossible as an inborn contradiction?" Very well, skeptic. I concede that there is nothing intrinsically impossible with homosexuality as an inborn contradiction. But if that is how the secular progressives opt out of their conundrum - if they escape the problem of proposing an inborn contradiction between physiology and psychology by acknowledging the contradiction and appealing to the fact that people are born flawed all the time (which, from what I can see, is a perfectly tenable position) - then they simultaneously reveal that their posture towards homosexuality is all wrong. It is the goal of secular progressives to defend homosexuality as a legitimate and healthy relationship. But if they defend the idea that one can be born a homosexual by appealing to the fact that people can be born flawed, then they simultaneously concede that homosexuality is itself a flaw and therefore an illegitimate relationship. Now, we do not simply let autistic children run amok; we value them enough to give them all the tools we can to help them function in a world full of people who do not understand them. If homosexuality is to be lumped in with autism as a patent, inborn flaw, why not, to the best of our ability, help them to reverse the problem rather than letting them run amok? If anything, we, at least, had better not be enabling them to "go on in their ways".

I realize that this idea of "rehabilitating homosexuals" might be startling to some, but try to focus merely on what I am saying. If the secular progressive is going to justify the "born this way" argument by acknowledging homosexuality as a flaw, then he must treat it as a flaw and as something that needs rehabilitating. Those are simply the hardcore facts. I say "if the secular progressive wishes to say this" because I do not believe that homosexuality can be inborn at all. But I do not insist on this. The reader has two conclusions in front of him: either homosexuality is a mixture of nature and nurture, and therefore more or less of a conscious choice on the homosexual’s part, or else homosexuality is inborn but as a problem which needs correcting.  And at every point, he is vehemently prevented by physiological concerns to honestly conclude that homosexuality is a fitting and healthy relationship for two individuals.

And yet some of you may remain unconvinced.  Some of you continue to insist, “I’ll not be told what I must and mustn't do by my physical attributes!”  This is, I think, the very center of the issue: the body and its relationship to personal identity.  I’ll need to consider this very carefully.

7) On the Issue of Homosexuality: a Failed Rebellion

With obesity rates ever climbing and sex becoming ever present in commercials, it is not hard to see that American culture (and European culture as well, if I’m not mistaken) largely regards the body as an object to be used and abused at the hands of one’s own personal will.  There is, to put it poetically, a war going on; a kind of rebellion of personal will against one’s own body.  Men and women alike say to themselves, “I am going to do such-and-such thing or engage in such-and-such activity and I don’t care what the body tells me about it.”  They hope to enslave the body to their own will.

I find such a state of affairs - such a rebellion - to be entirely unwarranted.  The body is not only necessary but integral: necessary because, from what we can see, without a body we do not have a will, and integral because the status and shape of that body affects the status and shape of the will.  Psychology, as I have said so many times before, is deeply and profoundly connected to one’s physiology.  Rebellion is rather a poor response to something so integral to your existence, wouldn’t you say?  Being rather a graceless traitor to a loving lord?  

But don’t just take it from me.  Take it from the actual results of the rebellion.  They - that is, the rebels - tell us that they have succeeded, and that the body is conquered.  The sexually promiscuous tell us that their wills have been freed from the shackles of the body, and that they are finally able to please themselves using their body according to their will, now unfettered by any so-called “biological precedent”.  They present themselves as war-heroes, victorious in their noble rebellion.  That is not what I see.  

Even a cursory study of modern rhetoric gives one the sense that one must obey the bodily desire for sex whenever it should rear its head. If my body creates in me the urge to have sex with the girl at this club the moment the opportunity arises, I had darn well better do it, or I’ll be lying awake with regret all night.  It doesn’t matter what I really want or what I think is best for me.  My actual will - my genuine ability to choose - is taken and replaced with whatever my body desires at the present moment.  It is not in the question whether or not I am going to have sex when the natural, bodily urge to do so emerges.  What we see here is not the will’s domination of the body, but the body’s domination of the will.

Thus, in a kind of cruel and poetic irony, the very goal which the rebels set out to accomplish is reversed and heaped back on them.  The rebellion has failed; the defending side is victorious.  Man’s attempted domination of his body has resulted in the body dominating him.  The sexually promiscuous tell us that they are rulers, but the words of the society which they built betrays them.  They must have sex whenever their body wills them to do it.  They do not have the power to stimulate some bodily impulses and ignore others.  They are all sail and no rudder.

It would seem, then, that it is the pious man - the one who accepts what the body tells him about his identity and resolves to save his virginity for his wife - who is in control of his body, and the sexually promiscuous man who is blown about by its every whim.  At the very threshold of human identity, there is paradox.  The idea that one can “dominate” the body in the sense that they can divide it from their will and then use it as a kind of tool is farcical and only creates the reverse effect.  By contrast, willful submission to what the body tells oneself about their identity is also a form of domination over the body. Attempts to dominate the body in terms of identity only result in loss of identity and day to day enslavement to the body’s impulses.  But submission to the body in terms of identity results in identity gained, and ultimate self-domination over body, will, and everything in between.  

8) On the Issue of Homosexuality: Conclusion

That is why I consider homosexuality to be an unhealthy relationship; it is a rebellion against what the body tells oneself about their identity.  Heterosexuality is the submission, and thus ultimately the domination, of the body.  But I’d like to repeat that this is what I believe is best for any given person.  Remember that the rules of relating are for one’s own good.  I do not believe that a homosexual who becomes a heterosexual has lost something; I believe that he has gained something.  A man’s relationship with other men, once de-sexualized, becomes psychologically better, healthier, and more genuine.  Love, as it is between two of the same gender, has not been lost by the removal of sex.  It has gained something.  Love is no less intense between two of the same gender as between two of opposite genders.  It is merely expressed differently.

1) Faith Again: Introduction

Exactly what faith is has never been all too big of an issue; the exact nature of faith’s relationship to good deeds, on the other hand, has been a point of theological contention between Christians for millennia.  The following intends to explore that relationship as it appears in the Bible, starting first by disarming misconceptions and going on to establish a conception of its own.  It is here argued that faith is something of a marriage – a relationship, if you will – between what someone believes and what someone does.  Faith in Christ implies both believing His truth claims and placing yourself in obedience to His commands.  It does not imply the absence of doubt or evil deeds, but rather their subordination to trust and good deeds, respectively (the nature of this subordination is too profound for me to explore in this essay).  Faith, in short, is the motivation out of which good deeds spring.

2) Faith Again: The Problem of James

In the Christian world today, one means through which the idea of faith is distorted is through what I believe to be misled interpretations of the gospel of James, specifically chapter 2 verses 14-26.  Not that I contend that the whole book should be thrown out and considered uncanonical; I’m sure that there are plenty of informed people with such an opinion, but being myself brutally uneducated, I am forced to operate on the a priori assumption that James was, in fact, divinely inspired upon writing his letter.  James’s repeated assertion in verses 17, 20, and 26 that “faith without deeds is dead” is often cited by those who vouch for a works-based soteriology (by this, I am referring to a plan of salvation dependent entirely upon the individual’s good deeds).  

Christians with a faith-based soteriology (that is, a plan of salvation dependent entirely upon the individual’s faith in Christ) counter by reminding such people that a works-based soteriology is simply impossible to square with the overall message of the gospel of John, specifically 3:15-16, 6:40, and 8:24.  In addition, there are several instances within Paul’s epistles where he clearly advises against a works-based soteriology, while at the same time upholding a faith-based soteriology:

For we maintain that a man is justified by faith apart from observing the law (Rom. 3:28 NIV, see also Rom. 8:3-4, Gal. 3:23-25, 5:4-6, Eph. 2:8-9, Phil. 3:9, Col. 2:13-14, and Tit. 3:4-5).

Paul’s beliefs are affirmed also in the letter written to the Hebrews by an unknown author, possibly even Paul himself:

The former regulation is set aside because it was weak and useless (for the law made nothing perfect), and a better hope was introduced, by which we draw near to God (Heb. 7:18-19, see also Heb. 10:1-4).

Peter and John affirm this soteriology to lesser degrees in their own letters (1 Pet. 1:9 and 1 John 5:11-12).  I agree with these contentions entirely, but in regards to deriving a works-based soteriology from the gospel of James, I would like to make an even bolder argument.  Even if the epistle of James is allowed to stand alone, verses 14-26 in the second chapter of James cannot support a works-based soteriology.

3) Faith Again: Finding James

It is necessary to note that people do not simply have faith out of thin air; their faith is always in something, whether that be Jesus, or the Buddha, or that one piece of obscure but powerful advice your kindergarten teacher gave you ever so long ago.  The question therefore becomes: when James talks about faith, what is he assuming as the object of that faith?  Historical context strongly suggests that this object is Jesus Christ; the historians tell us that James was busily working to expand the Christian church at the time this letter was written.  This strong indication is affirmed as a certainty by another verse in the letter:

My brothers, as believers in our glorious Lord Jesus Christ, don’t show favoritism (James 2:1 NIV, emphasis added).

Consider also James’ own language.  Every instance of the word “faith” as it is found in James 2:14-26 is derived from the Greek word pistis, which can be translated to specifically indicate “reliance upon Christ for salvation” (Strong #G4102).  This certainly changes things.  Not only can we derive the object of “faith” as the word is used by James but also the reason for it.  James advocates faith in Christ for salvation.  And this, as we can clearly see, clashes vehemently with a works-based soteriology.

Allow me to demonstrate the point a little more clearly.  A works-based soteriology does not, in fact, result in a complete absence of “faith” in the broad sense, as the name – and its opposition to a faith-based soteriology – seems to imply.  A works-based soteriology has merely shifted the object of one’s faith.  One who operates on a works-based soteriology has faith in his works for salvation instead of Christ.  But we have already seen – through inferences based on the historical context of, the language in, and the remainder of this epistle – that James has written what he has written on the assumption that his readers already rely on Christ for their salvation.  And, of course, you cannot rely both on your own works and Christ for salvation simultaneously.  Christ’s words echo, “No man can serve two masters” (Matt. 6:24 and Luke 16:13).  We must choose one or the other: either we embrace a faith-based soteriology as advocated by Jesus, Paul, Peter, John, and, yes, even poor, misunderstood James, or we embrace a works-based soteriology for God knows why.

4) Faith Again: A Brief Rejoinder

We therefore conclude that a faith-based soteriology is biblical.  But this, in no way whatsoever, means that we throw out deeds completely.  That is clearly heresy.  It would result in a head-on collision with the words of James, not to mention seriously bringing into question many of the words of John:

If we claim to have fellowship with Him yet walk in the darkness, we lie and do not live by the truth (1 John 1:6 NIV, see also 2:4, 2:6, 2:9, 3:6, 3:9, and 3 John 1:11).

Consider also the words of the apostle Peter:

But just as He who called you is holy, so be holy in all you do; for it is written: ‘Be holy, because I am holy.’ (1 Pet. 1:15-16 NIV, see also 1 Pet. 2:11-12)

Even Paul, our primary advocate of raw faith, knows not to thrust aside good deeds.  In his letter to the Romans especially, he is well aware that his faith and grace centered theology brings about the temptation to go on sinning, and his repeated attempts to reel in his audience on the matter is really quite heroic:

Do we, then, nullify the law by this faith?  Not at all!  Rather, we uphold the law. (Rom. 3:31 NIV)  

What shall we say, then?  Shall we go on sinning so that grace may increase?  By no means!  We died to sin; how can we live in it any longer? (Rom. 6:1-2 NIV)  

What then?  Shall we sin because we are not under law but under grace?  By no means! (Rom. 6:15 NIV)

Lastly and mostly, we have Jesus’ confirmation as to the importance of good deeds (Matt. 5:20, 7:24-27, Luke 6:31, 6:47-49, John 8:11, 14:21, and John 14:23-24).  We must stick to the bare-bone facts as the Bible has explicitly fed them to us, reading between the lines only barely, wherever warranted by context.  We have two such facts.  First, salvation is achieved by faith in Jesus Christ apart from works.  Second, faith and works share an inseparable bond, such that, if works are divorced from faith, faith ceases to exist.  The question therefore becomes: what is the nature of this bond?  What relationship do faith and deeds share?

5) Faith Again: Testing One Hypothesis

We might begin by hypothesizing that deeds are meant to show that one has faith.  James certainly seems to think so:

Show me your faith without deeds, and I will show you my faith by my deeds (James 2:18 NIV)

And it is indeed true that good deeds, as a general rule, are proof of being in the Christian life (Rom. 6:2-4, return to 1 John 2:4, 2:6, 2:9, 3:6, 3:9, and 3 John 1:11).  But we must distinguish.  It will not do to say that good deeds are meant to prove faith.  That is, we do not perform good deeds for the sole purpose of proving our faith.  Jesus repeatedly railed on the Pharisees and Sadducees of His day for their over-emphasis on proving their religiousness:

And when you pray, do not be like the hypocrites, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and on the street corners to be seen by men.  I tell you the truth, they have received their reward in full (Matt. 6:5 NIV, see also Matt. 23:5-7, Mk. 12:38-40 and Lk. 20:46-47)

Common sense should tell us that looking at someone in need and thinking, “Well, I’d better go help that person to prove that I have faith in Jesus Christ,” is an invitation to hypocrisy.  To whom are we trying to prove our faith?  God?  That is really rather foolish.  To people?  Nothing wrong with that, as far as it goes.  But why not, rather, help someone in need because you love them?  Isn’t that Jesus’ call to action (Matt. 22:39, Mk. 12:31, see also Rom. 13:9-10)?  If you are only helping them in order to prove something, you are still ultimately being selfish.  So what we have here is a useless fact.  It is indeed true that deeds prove the existence of faith.  But that is not why we do them.  Why, then, do we do good deeds?  If it is indeed true that a living faith is supplemented by deeds as James says, it is quite important for us to find their source; that is, what motivates us to do them.

6) Faith Again: There is no Motivation

Unfortunately, the Bible largely regards this question as an absurdity.  Consider Paul’s words again:

What shall we say, then?  Shall we go on sinning so that grace may increase?  By no means!  We died to sin; how can we live in it any longer? (Rom. 6:1-2 NIV)  

When confronting a possible hole in his argument, Paul states that we should not sin because we (the Christians) have died to sin.  But if I was really arrogant, I might then ask, “Why should I die to sin?” to which he would probably be forced to answer, “Because you should.”  You see what has happened?  We are talking in circles.  Now, I do not disdain the Bible for writing off the question, “Why should we do what is right?”  Indeed, if we explore the basic logic of the original question, we realize that it is intrinsically absurd.  We have essentially asked, “Why should we do what we should do?”  Well, there’s no point in asking why we should do what we should do.  We simply should do it.  There may well be reasons for abstaining from sin; for instance, a Christian may abstain from premarital sex to avoid unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease.  But these possible downsides do not fully explain why a wrong deed is wrong and a right deed is right.  Things are not wrong because they are detrimental, they are detrimental because they are wrong.  Why are they wrong?  That answer remains rooted in the character of an inscrutable God.

7) Faith Again: Good Deeds Will be Done

So we find that searching for a motivation for doing good deeds is a useless pursuit.  But that does not mean that good deeds do not, in a different sense, have a source.  The quotation cited above states that the source of abstinence from sin results from being dead to it, which already gives us something of a lead.  A thoroughgoing study of the New Testament reveals a recurring theme of “New Life” (Rom. 6:18, 2 Cor. 5:17, Eph. 2:4-5, 1 Pet. 2:16, 1 John 1:7, and 1 John 3:1-2); it is further asserted by the Bible that the New Life is tied closely with the doing of good deeds:

We know that we have come to know Him if we obey His commands.  The man who says, “I know Him,” but does not do what He commands is a liar, and the truth is not in him.  But if anyone obeys His word, God’s love is truly made complete in him.  This is how we know we are in Him: Whoever claims to live in Him must walk as Jesus did (1 John 2:3-6 NIV, see also Rom. 6:1, 6:15-18, 1 John 2:9-11)

In other words, someone who is in the New Life simply will do good deeds; it’s not a question or a cause for concern, really.  Those who are reborn will act like it (in a sense, whether they like it or not, though they are quite certain to like it, since they are, indeed, reborn).  We are getting close.  If only we can find the method of entrance into this New Life, we can find the ultimate source of good deeds, and therefore better characterize their relationship to faith.  Again, the apostle John is particularly helpful on the topic:

Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ is born of God, and everyone who loves the Father loves His Child as well.  This is how we know that we love the children of God: by loving God and carrying out His commands.  This is love for God: to obey His commands.  And His commands are not burdensome, for everyone born of God overcomes the world.  This is the victory that has overcome the world, even our faith.  Who is it that overcomes the world?  Only he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God (1 John 5:1-5 NIV, see also Gal. 3:26)

In this verse, we find the entire conclusion laid out for us; the entire conundrum sorted out and tied up with a satisfyingly beautiful bow.  We know that good deeds proceed from being in the New Life, and, thanks to this passage, we now know that being in the New Life (being a “son of God” as John puts it) proceeds from faith in Jesus Christ.  It follows that good deeds proceed from faith.  If someone in the New Life simply will do good deeds, and the New Life is entered via faith, then it follows that the one with faith simply will do good deeds.  If you must, you might look at it in strict cause-and-effect terms (though the actual relationship is likely far more dynamic).  Good deeds are caused by faith – it is the character out of which they spring.

8) Faith Again: Addressing Concerns

Some possible counterpoints should be addressed before getting too excited.  There are verses in the Bible which imply that it is not, in fact, by faith that one enters the New Life but by baptism:

Or don’t you know that all of us who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?  We were therefore buried with Him through baptism into death in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life (Romans 6:4 NIV, see also 1 Cor. 12:13 and Gal. 3:27-29)

It would seem from this and the verses below cited that the New Life in Christ was entered into via physical baptism.  This threatens, to a noticeable degree, the conclusion to which we have already come – that the New Life is entered via faith in Christ, not to mention even suggesting contradiction within the Bible.  Luckily, however, this contradiction is softened in light of the consideration that baptism is usually done because of one’s faith in Jesus Christ.  Indeed, it can be further argued not simply that baptism is done out of faith in Christ, but that you cannot be baptized in a spiritually significant way unless you have faith in Christ.  We know that rituals commanded by Christ are not safe from misuse:

Therefore, whoever eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of sinning against the body and blood of the Lord.  A man ought to examine himself before he eats of the bread and drinks of the cup.  For anyone who eats and drinks without recognizing the body of the Lord eats and drinks judgment on himself (1 Cor. 11:27-29 NIV)

This above example is of Communion (or Eucharist if you prefer), and its ability to be used unworthily.  From this, we have reason to suspect that baptism, too, can be done unworthily.  If this is indeed so, what would differentiate between worthy and unworthy baptism?  Again, Acts is particularly helpful:

And Philip said, “If you believe with all your heart, you may [be baptized].”  And [the Ethiopian] replied, “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.” (Acts 8:37 HCSB)

This goes to show that faith in Jesus Christ is an integral part to baptism in His name.  Indeed, practice affirms the conclusion that baptism is done out of faith in Jesus Christ.  I have yet to meet someone who was baptized into the name of someone they thought merely to be a great moral teacher or a lunatic.  This should give us the sense that baptism is made efficacious by one’s faith; it is how one is baptized into Christ’s rather than another’s name (see Acts 19:1-7).  It is also notable that this does not work the other way around.  The Bible does not indicate that one’s faith is useless until he gets baptized, but it does give us cause to doubt faithless baptism.  The contradiction between John’s and Paul’s words is therefore liquefied in light of the fact that baptism and faith are inextricably linked.  If you get baptized (the right way), it is out of faith in and obedience to Jesus Christ anyway.

This, by the way, brings us full circle back to the conclusion which is here being defended – the idea that good deeds proceed from faith.  Baptism is easily classified as a good deed; Jesus said that “it is proper for us [to be baptized] to fulfill all righteousness” (Matt. 3:15 NIV).  And if indeed baptism is done out of faith, then this further hardens our conclusion that good deeds proceed from faith.  Baptism may not activate faith, but it can be said to proceed from it.  It is the perfect expression of faith and the New Life which it created in the faithful; our first example of faith’s ability to generate good deeds.  Baptism is the “first fruit” of faith.