Wednesday, April 29, 2015

3) Engaging the Problem of Evil: The "Standard "Argument

               First off, it seems to me rather obvious that the existence God cannot be objected to on evil’s account.  Quite the contrary: evil cannot exist unless our beginning assumption is that God exists.  I have already argued this more extensively elsewhere[1], and it is not the first time that such an argument has been presented[2].  For now, we’ll have to do with a sharp and concise summary of that argument, due to space constraints.
                It seems to me obvious that evil requires some standard of good; evil might be perfectly and completely described as non-good, and in order to do that, we need some standard of what good is.  If evil is that which is undesirable, we need a standard of what is desirable.  If evil is injustice, we need a standard of justice.  What we are interested with at present is the particular qualities that this standard must possess in order to make sense of evil.
                First off, is the standard objective or subjective?  Is it wholly independent of what others think about it or is it wholly determined by what people make of it?  We can clearly conclude it to be the former for three reasons: 1) if evil is subjective, the Atheist’s objection against God on its account falls flat on the floor.  I have a few more insights to supply about this later.  2) There is not a person on earth who thinks that he is perfect; the one who does, we call “insane”.  As such, there is in fact no person capable of properly judging what is and is not evil.  The standard which judges whether or not something is evil cannot itself contain a shred of evil; if it did, then by what standard should we say that that standard had been judged to contain evil?  We’d have an endless recession of almost-but-not-quite-good standards.  The imperfection of man proves that there is some standard of good undetermined by man himself from which he has fallen short.  3) If something is perfectly subjective, then it does not exist.  What I mean to say in relation to goodness is that there can be no coherent idea of goodness if it is perfectly subjective to what someone says about it.  Picture a world full of mirrors and only mirrors.  Boggling as it is to realize, such a world has no color.  The color in this world is perfectly subjective, but until any objective color is introduced, there is still no color.
                Second, is the objective standard natural or supernatural?  Clearly the latter.  When the Atheist says that evil exists, it is more accurate to say that he is saying that evil exists in the natural world.  Note that this means that the whole natural world is being compared to a standard of good.  And if the standard itself also exists in the natural world, we make the following claims:
                1. Everything in the natural world is being compared to an objective standard of good
                2. The objective standard of good is in the natural world
                3. Therefore, the objective standard of good is being compared to itself
                It is imperative that we opt out of this argument because its conclusion is an absurdity; something cannot be compared to itself simply by virtue of what comparison is.  We cannot say that the conclusion does not logically follow – the argument is valid.  Now, are the premises true?  Clearly, we cannot deny premise (1).  If mankind were to, say, fly billions of light years to another planet and populate there, surely evil would still be a problem.  There is, however, no good reason why we cannot deny premise (2) by stating that the objective standard of good is, in fact, in the supernatural world.  We therefore conclude that the objective standard of good is supernatural.
                One last qualifier must be brought up for this objective, supernatural standard.  One thing which it makes us aware of is moral evil.  The standard, therefore, must be a measure of moral good.  But moral evil is, in fact, an abuse of free will; moral evil does not exist in the absence of free will.  Furthermore, you cannot be morally good without free will; someone who does something good mechanistically is not being morally good.  We are therefore forced to conclude that the objective, supernatural standard has a will of its own, and it always uses this will for good.  Otherwise, we wouldn’t know that man’s will was off kilter.
                In conclusion, we have an objective, supernatural standard of good with a will of its own.  In other words, we have the theistic God!




[1] see my entries under February 28, 2015 on blogofangrymen.blogspot.com
[2] see especially essays 14 and 15 in God and Evil

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