Another line of argumentation before changing moods. In the paragraphs above, I said that Atheists
cannot object to God’s existence on account of subjective evil. I’d here like to unpack that concept a little
further, because I believe that it can provide for us some serious and
practical insights. I here state that
unless God is in the picture, evil does not hurt enough to object to God on its
account.
Now, in a world
without God, evil might, at best, be decided some set of objective, immutable
principles – much like the laws of physics and mathematics – which can be
scrutinized by deeper human reason[1]. But if that is really all that evil is, then
it does not hurt very much at all. To
say that Hitler, Stalin, etc. aligned their lives with this set of inherently
“wrong” principles rather than that set of inherently “right” principles gives
us a kind of evil which really isn’t very difficult to put up with. You might just as soon be personally hurt and upset when an
astrophysicist gets his sums wrong. This
kind of evil does not hurt enough to object to the theist’s worldview on its
account.
But let’s just say, for the sake of argument, that there
exists a single, immutable Omnibenevolence which has decreed man to be
benevolent to his fellow creatures. In
such a world, evil would be very
personal. Not only would each act of
evil be a trespass against the Omnibenevolence – it would be a gross trespass
of man against his fellow man, especially since the Omnibenevolence decrees that
he is being quite worthy of benevolence from his fellow creature. Evil, in this model, is brutally defiant of
Goodness itself and dehumanizing to the fellow man.
I want to make sure that these next points are extremely
clear; their importance is instrumental in understanding the problem of
evil. If this model is true, then evil hurts enough for the Atheist to deny
that God exists. If the Atheists are
right – if evil hurts as much as they say it does – then they have every right
to challenge God’s existence. I readily
concede that. But evil can only hurt as much as the Atheist says it does if this
model is true, and if this model is true, then we know for a fact that God exists
– he would be the Omnibenevolence, of course.
The Atheist can only object to God’s existence if evil hurts to x
degree, but evil can only hurt to x degree if God exists[2].
[1]
Note that this conception of morality does not well account for moral
imperatives; again, see essays 14 and 15 in God
and Evil for more discussion on this.
[2]
Essay 13 in God and Evil unpacks
insights similar to these arguments, “Only a fully biblical view of theism that
upholds the purity and holiness of God and the irreparably devastating nature
of evil can present the problem in all of its force.”
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